The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays book. Happy reading The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays Pocket Guide.

Advertisement Hide. Moral responsibility—What is all the fuss about?

The Nature of Moral Responsibility Essays by Randolph Clarke for sale online | eBay

Moral Responsibility. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Clarke R. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. In Free Will and Moral Responsibility , eds. French, H.

Subscriber Login

Wettstein and J. Boston: Blackwell. Google Scholar. Pereboom D.

Moral Responsibility

Kane, — Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smiley M.

Manipulation and Moral Responsibility

Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community. See details for additional description. Skip to main content. About this product. Brand new: lowest price The lowest-priced, brand-new, unused, unopened, undamaged item in its original packaging where packaging is applicable. Author:-Clarke, Randolph. Read full description. See details and exclusions. See all 2 brand new listings. Qty: 1 2. For more on this distinction, see the first three chapters of Scanlon In other words, blaming someone involves not just the belief that they have acted in a way that impairs your relationship with them, but also, that you take yourself to have reasons to revise your intentions and attitudes towards them, and accordingly that you revise these intentions and attitudes on the basis of such reasons.

Like Sher, then, Scanlon has provided an initially plausible account of what it is to blame. But also like Sher, his account has been widely criticized. The most common line of criticism is best summed up by R. More precisely, Wallace argues that. Susan Wolf has also argued that in some cases, such as the case of a hot-headed but ultimately loving family, it seems that you can blame another without taking yourself to have impairments in your relationship or attendant reasons to revise your intentions or attitudes towards that person.

After all, many cases of wrongdoing involve strangers—e. Nevertheless, it still seems that it is possible to blame those with whom we have no standing relationship. So blame cannot essentially implicate interpersonal relationships. However, whether this kind of relationship is sufficient to explain the blame of strangers is unclear.

Functional accounts of blame are analogous to functionalist theories of mental states or properties. Instead of identifying blame with any particular attitude like a judgment or emotion or combination of attitudes like a belief-desire pair , functional accounts of blame identify blame by its functional role.

This way of proceeding leaves open the particular attitude or combination of attitudes that constitute blame. In this way, functional accounts can be more flexible. According to one functional account of blame, the function of blame is protest. But this, of course, means that any number of attitudes or combination of attitudes could be present in blame. Pamela Hieronymi , Matthew Talbert , and Victoria McGeer argue that reactive attitudes like resentment and the expressions of these attitudes serve as powerful forms of protest.

Angela Smith , on the other hand, argues that when we modify our attitudes and intentions as Scanlon envisions, but do so as a form of protest , then we are actually blaming.

A Philosophy Blog

And in order to count as a protest, it need not involve any particular emotional state. See Franklin and Houston for more on the way in which blame allows us to stand up for our values. There are at least two sources of concern for those theories that take protest to be the function of blame. Second, protest seems paradigmatically expressed. Do workers protest unfair labor conditions simply through their beliefs or attitudes? Or must they make such beliefs and attitudes known? After all, not all blame is expressed. These objections are not decisive, of course, but they do suggest that there is more work to be done in defense of protest views to help us better understand what the nature of protest is, such that appeals to protest can provide a non-circular account of blame.

Of course, there might be other functions of blame: to express or communicate condemnation or disapproval, for example. Michael McKenna , has argued for such an account. In particular, McKenna claims that the reactive attitudes and their expressions serve this function. Antony Duff has proposed a similar understanding of the aim of blame, according to which it is.

: The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays

Along these lines Coleen Macnamara , has also argued that our practices of holding others morally responsible more generally a set of practices that includes blame are communicative in their function. In a similar vein, Christopher Bennett claims that blame functions symbolically to express our disapproval. Most recently, Miranda Fricker claims that communicative blame, which identifies and communicates faults, is the paradigmatic case of blame. Because of their relative newness to the scene, there is not much criticism of these views.

However, one potential problem with these views is that many perhaps most instances of blame are not expressed or communicated. In what sense are those instances of blame communicative? And if they are not, how can blame be essentially communicative in its nature?

  • The Nature of Moral Responsibility Essays by Randolph Clarke 9780190883942.
  • The Nature of Moral Responsibility - Randolph Clarke - Häftad () | Bokus;
  • Staff View: The nature of moral responsibility :.
  • Rigorous Atomic and Molecular Physics.
  • Similar books and articles.
  • The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship (Oxford Political Theory).

That sense remains elusive, but see McKenna and Macnamara for more discussion. This list provides a nice initial taxonomy of ways that blame can go awry: an ethics of blame will need to take into consideration a facts about the blamer, b facts about the blaming interaction itself, and c facts about the person being blamed.

Keep in mind, too, that how you answer the question of what blame is will influence these ethical questions, since the propriety conditions of a judgment are plausibly distinct from the propriety conditions of a rebuke. Because we are not here endorsing a particular theory of blame, our characterization of the norms in question will operate at a level of abstraction that floats free of substantive commitments concerning the nature of blame. We set these cases aside for the purposes of our discussion. Begin by considering potentially relevant facts about the person who is being blamed.

A natural answer to the question of when blame is appropriate is to say that blame is only appropriate when the person blamed is in fact blame worthy. This may sound at first like an unhelpful tautology—after all, what could it mean to be worthy of blame if not simply that you can be appropriately blamed? That is, only when certain facts about the person being blamed are in place. Which facts? What does one have to do to earn blame? As we noted in section 1 above, being to blame i. Only certain creatures are even candidates for blame in the first place, and though it is a matter of some controversy which precise capacities are required, the list certainly includes the capacities for reflection, deliberation, decision-making, and self-determination.

These individuals, it seems, can still act in morally significant ways—indeed, in ways we would naturally describe as cruel and even evil—but whether they can earn moral blame as opposed merely to giving us good reason to protect ourselves from them is a vexed question see Watson and Shoemaker for insightful discussion.